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The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents
and the Significance of a State Line
Robert Allen Sedler*
The decision in Cipolla v. Shaposka' should be pleasing to the "en-
lightened territorialists" such as Professor Cavers2 and Professor Twer-
ski.3 For an "anti-territorialist" such as the present writer, whose ap-
proach to choice of law is based primarily upon interest analysis and
considerations of fairness applied in the context of particular cases,
4
it has a somewhat different effect. It forces him to reconsider whether
there is any validity to the "territorial imperative," 5 to which, in the
past, either out of excess timidity or some notion of constitutional com-
pulsion, he has made some obeisance. The results of that reconsidera-
tion are contained herein. An approach to conflicts problems based
upon interest analysis and considerations of fairness necessarily recog-
nizes the significance of territorialism in two important respects. First it
recognizes that the occurrence of an act within a state may give rise to a
strong interest on the part of that state in implementing its admonitory
and regulatory policies.0 Secondly it recognizes that in consensual trans-
actions, where there have been extensive factual connections with a
particular state, the parties may have relied on the law of that state so
that the application of any other law would defeat their legitimate ex-
- B.A., 1956, J.D., 1959. University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky.
1. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
2. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965).
3. Twerski, Symposium article, herein.
4. Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967); Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the
Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method,
2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 8 (1970). I have summarized the approach as follows: "It is my
position that courts should make decisions on the displacement of the forum's law with
reference to the fact-law pattern of particular cases, and that the forum's law should be
displaced only when its application would defeat the legitimate expectations of the
parties or would be violative of the interests of other states, which, under the circum-
stances, the forum should recognize." Sedler, Conflict of Laws: Round Table Symposium,
49 TEx. L. REv. 211, 224 (1971).
5. From R. Ardery, THE TERrroIAL IMPERATIVE (1966).
6. See the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 67-8. See generally
Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts, see 36 MINN. L. REv.
(1951). For illustrative cases applying the law of the state of acting in order to implement
admonitory and regulatory policies see Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir., 1968)
(keys in car); Williams v. Rawling Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581 (1965) (vehicle registration
upon transfer); Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949) (alienation of affections);
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (dram shop act).
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pectations.7 To recognize the significance of territorialism in these two
respects is, of course, fully consistent with, and indeed, is an integral
part of the approach that I have been advocating. But there is a third
situation in which I have grudgingly given in to territorialism to reach
a result that is not consistent with interest analysis and party fairness
-the situation presented in Cipolla v. Shaposka.
In terms of interest analysis Cipolla presents a true conflict, a point
which was recognized by both the majority and the dissent.8 Pennsyl-
vania's policy is to provide full compensation to the victim of an auto-
mobile accident notwithstanding that he was a guest passenger. Since
the social and economic consequences of an automobile accident today
will be felt in the victim's home state, to which he will return,9 Penn-
sylvania's interest is no less because the accident occurred in another
state. Delaware's policy is to immunize the host. Whether the basis of
that policy is to protect the host against ungrateful guests-which no
one really believes 0 -or to protect insurance companies against collu-
sive suits," or simply to deny recovery for this kind of claim thereby in-
creasing the profits of insurance companies and possibly reducing in-
surance rates,1 Delaware, as the state of the defendant's residence and
the state where the vehicle is insured, 3 would have an interest in apply-
7. This would appear to be the basis for the "localizing" approach of the state of the
most significant relationship rule of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 188. Reliance on the law
of a state because of factual connections with that state is illustrated by Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961). See also People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,
48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), where considerations of fairness to a party because of
reliance on the law of another state precluded the forum from applying its own law
despite an apparent interest in so doing.
8. 267 A.2d at 857.
9. Unlike the situation that perhaps existed at an earlier period with respect to
injured workmen who were temporarily present in the forum, as reflected in Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), and Alaska
Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
10. However, as the dissent pointed out in Cipolla, this is the purpose the Delaware
courts have attributed to their guest statute. 267 A.2d at 858. In any event, in terms of
interest analysis, this would be a legitimate legislative purpose. As to the ascertainment
of legitimate state interest see the discussion in B. CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAws 143-4 (1963).
11. See the discussion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1969).
12. Whether or not the existence of a guest statute will actually reduce insurance rates
is highly problematical. Professor Morris has demonstrated rather persuasively that the
existence of a guest statute as such does not have actuarial significance. Rates will be
affected only by the incidence of guest-host claims, and if there is a pattern of travel from
a guest statute state into a non-guest statute state, e.g., from Delaware to Pennsylvania,
loss experience will reflect this fact. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial
Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574-7 (1961).
13. Insurance rates are based on loss experience in a territory of insureds. It does not
matter where the accident takes place. See the discussion in Morris, supra, note 12 at 567-9.
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ing its law here.14 In the case of a true conflict, the Currie type of in-
terest analysis dictates that each state apply its own law. 15
There can be no doubt that Pennsylvania would have applied its own
law had the accident occurred within its borders, and on this point the
territorialists-enlightened'6 and not so enlightenedl 7-would agree
with the proponents of interest analysis. Is But the accident occurred in
Delaware, and at least for the present writer, it is at this point that the
grudging concession to territorialism has come into play. In referring
to this kind of case I have stated:
Of course, [this] case could only arise if defendant were personally
served in the non-immunity state. Let us assume that he is. Since
the injury occurred in the immunity state and defendant is a resi-
dent of that state, despite the interest of the non-immunity state in
applying its own law, there is a question of whether it could
constitutionally do so. This much of the territorial principle seem-
ingly remains, that a state may not apply its law solely on the
ground that the plaintiff is a resident of that state. If defendant
did nothing in forum, the causing of an injury to the forum's resi-
dent in another state would not be a sufficient constitutional con-
tact to justify the forum's applying its own law.' 9
Until Cipolla-which incidentally did not go off on constitutional
grounds-I had no cases to cite directly in support of this proposition.
When pressed (as I have been by my students who, by the time we come
to this in class, have been thoroughly exposed to the virtues of interest
analysis) I have had to fall back on an analogy to Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick,20 which is not very satisfactory, since that case involved an in-
surance contract on property owned by a Texas corporation (Texas
14. In this regard it is irrelevant that the accident occurred in Delaware, as the majority
in Cipolla recognized. 267 A.2d at 856, n.2.
15. See the discussion in B. CURRIE, supra, note 10 at 181-2.
16. See the discussion in D. CAVERS, supra, note 2 at 139-145.
17. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378 (1934). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)§§ 145, 146. I view the Restatement (Second) as essentially continuing the rules approach
of the original Restatement, and merely changing the rules. See the discussion in Sedler,
Babcock in Kentucky, supra, note 4 at 41, 61-62.
18. Professor Ehrenzweig, whom I refer to as a policy-centered theorist, strongly rejects
analysis, and in this situation would say that Delaware law should apply. His "true rule,"
based on considerations of foreseeability and insurability, looks to the state where the
vehicle is insured to determine liability in guest statute cases. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT
OF LAws 577-581 (1962). Pennsylvania law as the "better law" and the law which would
advance the forum's governmental interests would apply under Professor Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. See generally Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influenc-
ing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
19. Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 68. See also Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson,
supra, note 4 at 127-8.
20. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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was the forum) but situate in Mexico where the corporation was doing
business. I have also fallen back on distinctions between the forum's
constitutionally applying its own law to protect its resident defendant
from liability on an out-of-state transaction, which, while deplored,21
does not seem to have raised constitutional questions,22 and applying
its law to allow a forum plaintiff to recover from a non-resident defen-
dant on an out-of-state transaction, drawing analogies to the law of
judicial jurisdiction. 28 Reluctant as I have been to argue in this vein
and to make this obeisance to territorialism, I stayed with my position
through two major law review articles and a score of conflicts classes.
Until Cipolla came along, I was able to avoid fully coming to grips
with this "vestige of territorialism" that was inconsistent with my basic
approach toward choice of law. I have come across only two other cases
presenting the situation where a "recovery" state plaintiff was suing a
"non-recovery" state defendant 24 in the plaintiff's home state for an
accident occurring in the defendant's home state.25 In both of these
cases I was able to find sufficient factual contacts with the plaintiff's
home state to constitutionally justify the application of that state's
law.26 This was not really possible in Cipolla, at least with the kind of
21. D. CAVERS, supra note 2 at 181-194.
22. See, e.g., Lilliental v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), where Oregon, on
"public policy" grounds, applied Oregon law to enable an Oregon "spendthrift" to avoid
liability on a California-centered contract. Professor Currie's classic illustration of interest
analysis, that of married women's contracts, is another example of such protection on the
part of the defendant's home state. B. CURRIE, supra, note 6 at 118-119.
23. While jurisdiction can always be exercised on the basis of a state's being the
defendant's residence, it is "inconceivable" that a court would exercise jurisdiction on the
sole ground that its resident was involved as plaintiff. Such jurisdiction is authorized in
contract cases by Art. 14 of the French Civil Code, and other courts will not recognize a
judgment entered on this basis. See the discussion in Nadelman, "Jurisdictionally Improper
Fora," in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTs LAW 329 (1961).
24. I use the terms "recovery" and "non-recovery" to encompass (1) the existence or
non-existence of substantive tort liability, (2) an anti-tort immunity, such as guest statute
or charitable immunity, and (3) limitations on damages recoverable for wrongful death. As
to "anti-tort" immunity, see Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 49-56.
25. In Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis.), the decedent, a resident
of Ohio, was killed in Wisconsin while inspecting machinery at the factory of a Wisconsin
corporation. Wisconsin limited the damages recoverable for wrongful death; Ohio did not.
In terms of interest analysis, the case, of course, presented a true conflict, and the federal
court, sitting as a Wisconsin court, applied Wisconsin law to limit recovery.
26. In Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968), the plaintiff was
a resident of Minnesota, a non-guest statute state, the driver was a resident of North
Dakota, a guest statute state, and the accident occurred in North Dakota. The driver was
a former resident of Minnesota, his vehicle had a Minnesota license plate, and he did
much of his work there. The particular accident resulted from a trip that began in
Minnesota and continued through both states. The Court applied Minnesota law, empha-
sizing the fact that the vehicle was regularly used in Minnesota.
In Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968), the decedent was a resident of
New York, and the defendant, his brother, was a resident of Maine at the time of the
accident, but had subsequently moved to New York. Maine had a limitation on the amount
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factual contacts I had used in the past. I probably should have wel-
comed the opportunity to confront my obeisance to territorialism that
an analysis of the case necessarily required. I have always contended
that conflicts problems should be approached only with reference to the
fact-law pattern of particular cases and that academic commentators
should concentrate on the kind of cases that actually do arise rather
than on the hypothetical ones which may never arise.27 In Cipolla, the
hypothetical case became real. Despite some initial resistance-moti-
vated by a not unnatural desire to avoid admitting that one was incor-
rect-I have been able to finally abandon this vestige of territorialism
and to take my stand as a pure anti-territorialist. In so doing, I find that
I am willing to go further than even I had thought possible in disre-
garding the territorial imperative and the significance of a state line.
I want to begin my analysis of the problem presented in Cipolla by
looking at what I call the existential-legal component of the case. By
that I mean I want to look at the realities of the case-in behaviorial
and practical terms-and to see how the law responds to those realities.
First let me look at the reality of the state line that separates Southeast
recoverable for wrongful death at the time of the accident (it was subsequently repealed),
while New York did not. The decedent and the defendant were engaged in business
together, and the decedent made frequent trips to Maine. I originally argued that the
continuing business relationship between the parties, which was the reason for the
decedent's presence in Maine at the time of the fatal accident, justified the application
of New York law and satisfied the "sufficient constitutional contact" test. Also, the fact
that the defendant was a resident of New York at the time of the suit would be relevant
for constitutional purposes, nothwithstanding that interests are usually determined at the
time of the accident in question. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
The New York court concentrated on "foreseeability and insurability." It pointed out
that under Maine law the defendant would have been fully liable for compensatory
damages if the decedent had lived, and that Maine automobile insurance policies did not
distinguish between liability for personal injuries and liability for wrongful death, so
that there was no "reliance" on the Maine limitation. 237 N.E.2d at 881. Also under
Maine law the insurance policy could not be limited to accidents occurring in Maine.
237 N.E.2d at 882. Thus, unlimited liability was "foreseeable and insurable," and there
was no unfairness in holding the insurer to the New York standard (it goes without say-
ing that the nominal defendant wanted his brother's beneficiaries to have full recovery
against his insurance company). Having found no unfairness to the parties by the applica-
tion of New York law, the Court next considered whether the application of that law
would "unduly interfere with a legitimate interest of a sister state" and concluded that
it would not. Here the fact that the defendant had moved to New York after the accident
was significant, since a judgment would not now be entered against a Maine resident.
And in any event, at the time of suit, Maine had removed the limitation. 237 N.E.2d
at 882. The Court also concluded that New York rather than Maine had the "most
significant relationship" with the issue, so that there was no constitutional infirmity in
the application of New York law. 237 N.E.2d at 883. The Miller case is an excellent
example of the "interest and fairness" approach, which totally disregards the "territorial
imperative." I now recognize that it did not need to be explained with reference to
"sufficient constitutional contacts," and its rationale is equally applicable to Cipolla, as I
will point out.
27. See the discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson, supra, note 4 at 102-105; Sedler,
Roundtable Symposium, supra, note 4 at 227.
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Pennsylvania and Northern Delaware. That line is, of course, legally
real. It has been said that the legal order is "decentralized among a
plurality of sovereign or autonomous authorities, each asserting juris-
diction within a defined territory. ' 28 When disputes arise involving the
territory or people of two or more legal systems, "The legal order tries
to integrate the diversity of laws of which it is composed. ' 29 As far as
different laws are concerned, the line is also factually real in the sense
that people recognize that a different sovereignty exists on the other
side of the state line, and as Professors Cavers and Twerski contend,30 it
is not unreasonable to expect them to be subject to the law of the state
where they are at the time they are acting.
But people do not live their day-to-day lives in the expectation of
legal consequences, and the decision to cross a state line will not usually
depend upon legal considerations. Moreover, in functional, socio-eco-
nomic and mobility terms, people do not live in or identify with a state
so much as they do with a particular area, which, depending on geog-
raphy, may be wholly within a particular state, or may cut across
state lines. Having lived the first twenty-four years of my life in Pitts-
burgh, I have some understanding of the different functional areas
that exist in Pennsylvania. As a Pittsburgher, I thought of myself
as living in Western Pennsylvania, or in a tri-state area which in-
cluded Northern West Virginia and Eastern Ohio. Philadelphia was
as remote from Pittsburgh in this sense as Washington or New York.
Likewise, as the facts in Cipolla make clear, Delaware County, Penn-
sylvania, and Wilmington, Delaware, are part of the same functional
socio-economic and, particularly for our purposes, mobility area. The
state line between Delaware County and Wilmington that has been
made significant for legal purposes then is not real insofar as the day-
to-day life of the people living in the area is concerned. Query, there-
fore, whether legal consequences should depend on the existence of a
state line that is not functionally real.
Secondly, in legal contemplation this was a suit between Michael
Cipolla and John Shaposka, Jr. Michael considered John a tortfeasor
and John considered Michael an unwanted guest, as evidenced by the
fact that he was asserting the defense of guest-host immunity. But as
everyone knows, the suit in reality was between Michael and John's
28. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. Cop'. L. 297(1953).
29. Ibid.
30. CAVERS, supra, note 2 at 147; Twerski, Symposium article at 12-13.
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insurer, the Allstate Insurance Company of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.
Thus, the real defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation, or at least a
company with its principal place of business there. Suppose that Penn-
sylvania had a direct action statute, so that Michael could have pro-
ceeded directly against the insurer. If this were so, would not this be
similar to a controversy between two Pennsylvanians arising out of an
accident in another state which, according to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, presents a false conflict and should be controlled by Pennsyl-
vania law?31 Let us also analyze the policies behind the guest statute
from this perspective. If the purpose of the guest statute is to protect
the host from ungrateful guests, should not the host be able to decide
whether he wants such protection, and if he decides that he does not,
why should the insurance company be able to avoid its contractual
obligation to cover his liability? Whereas, if the purpose is to protect
the insurance company from collusive suits, should not Pennsylvania
decide whether this Pennsylvania-based company should receive the
protection? And even if the purpose of the Delaware guest statute is
to lower insurance rates by excluding certain kinds of claim from recov-
ery (as well as protecting insurers of Delaware-registered automobiles
from collusive suits), its interest in implementing this policy is no
greater than Pennsylvania's interest in allowing recovery on the part of
its accident victim. May not this case have been decided as it was simply
because Pennsylvania did not have a direct action statute and continued
to maintain the fiction that the suit was between the passenger and the
host?32
On the other hand, it can be argued that the only reason that the suit
could be brought in Pennsylvania was because the defendant had been
personally served with process there. If we would abandon the concept
of "transient jurisdiction," the unsoundness of which has been well-
demonstrated,3 3 this case would not be before the Pennsylvania court
simply because the plaintiff "happened to catch the defendant there."
31. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Kuchinic v. McCrory,
422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
32. Professor Twerski states, "I think we rather underestimate the embarrassment of
the lawyer in the Cipolla case who had to explain to the defendant that he was being
dragged through a trial because no one was quite sure which law governed his activities."
Symposium article, 12. I would suggest that the insurance company lawyer was not at all
concerned about the nominal defendant, and that if he was embarrassed at all, it was
in telling the nominal defendant that his friend could not recover under the insurance
policy. The insurance company would expect to be "dragged through a trial" whenever
it refused to pay, which is why it hires expensive lawyers to represent it.
33. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 Y.ALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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The answer to this query is that the plaintiff did not "happen to catch
the defendant there." The defendant was served when he was playing
golf with the plaintiff in Pennsylvania,3 4 and it takes no feat of imagina-
tion to assume that this was pre-arranged. If Pennsylvania had a direct
action statute, the plaintiff could have gone against Allstate, the Penn-
sylvania-based insurer of the Delaware-registered automobile. The pre-
arranged service on the nominal defendant was simply a realistic
response to the unrealistic and fictitious legal concept which pretends
that an automobile accident suit is between the victim and the driver
-a concept that is totally absurd when the parties are personal friends
-rather than between the victim and the driver's insurer. Since the
victim and the insurer in Cipolla were Pennsylvanians for jurisdic-
tional purposes, there was nothing "transient" about Pennsylvania's
exercise of jurisdiction here.
Finally, there is the undisputable fact that if the accident had oc-
curred on the Pennsylvania side of the line-the parties were traveling
to Pennsylvania at the time- 5 the Pennsylvania court would have ap-
plied its own law36 and jurisdiction could have been sustained under
the non-resident motorist act.37 When I first thought about this point,
I reasoned that while it may not seem rational that the result in a case
should depend on whether an accident occurred on this side or that
side of a state line, nonetheless, state lines do exist and that such a re-
sult should be considered "the price of federalism." But, on further
reflection I asked, "Why should it be?" The result is justified as the
"price of federalism" only if we attach independent significance to the
state line. If the only reason to attach independent significance to the
state line is that this is the "price of federalism," we have fallen prey-
as we so frequently do-to circular reasoning. 38 It is not the "price of
federalism" unless we are willing to pay that price, and we do not have
to pay it unless we are willing to say that a federal system requires that
we attach independent significance to the existence of a state line.
34. Deposition of M.F. Cipolla, Record, p. 23.
35. Opinion of Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Record, p. 41.
36. As both Professor Cavers and Professor Twerski would advocate. Cavers, supra,
note 2 at 139-145; Twerski, Symposium article, 7-8. See the discussion of this case in
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson, supra, note 4 at 117-20.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 75 § 2001.
38. The justification for allowing a suit that is not barred by the forum's statute of
limitations but is barred by the state whose substantive law will govern is that the statute
of limitations "destroys only the remedy, not the right." But the reason given for the
conclusion that the statute of limitations destroys only the remedy is that suit can be
maintained in another forum with a longer limitation period. See the discussion in
Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492, 496 (1919).
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Realistically, to say that a choice of law decision should not depend on
the side of a state line where an accident occurs will in no way affect
the vitality of our federal system.
Looking at the case existentially then, I come to the conclusion that
Pennsylvania should apply its own law and allow recovery. The dispute
essentially involves a Pennsylvania plaintiff and a Pennsylvania-based
insurance company. If there is a conflict between Pennsylvania's policy
of allowing compensation to an accident victim and Delaware's policy
of protecting insurance companies and perhaps reducing Delaware in-
surance rates, there is no valid reason why Pennsylvania should defer to
Delaware's policy and no rational way by which a court can decide
which policy should be preferred.39 There is nothing unfair about the
application of Pennsylvania law here. The nominal defendant's insur-
ance policy covers guest-host accidents; the insurance company did not
rely on Delaware law in setting its rates; and the fact that Delaware has
a guest statute would only affect the loss experience that was the basis
of those rates peripherally, if at all.40 The lack of unfairness is demon-
strated most cogently by the fact that if the accident had occurred on
the Pennsylvania side of the line, it would have been assumed that the
application of Pennsylvania law was perfectly fair. In terms of reliance
and the expectations of the insurance company and the nominal de-
fendant, it is difficult to see how any unfairness results from the appli-
cation of Pennsylvania law even if the accident occurred on the
Delaware side of the line. 41 Thus, based on considerations of policy and
fairness, I would say that Pennsylvania should have applied its own law
in Cipolla and allowed recovery.42
The only possible obstacle to the application of Pennsylvania law
would be my concern with "sufficient constitutional contacts." Having
39. See the discussion in B. Currie, supra, note 10 at 181-2.
40. See the discussion, supra, note 12.
41. Professor Twerski concedes the absence of unfairness in this regard. Symposium
article, 6-8. The unsoundness of the notion that the application of Pennsylvania law would
be unfair, because "inhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of liability exceed-
ing that created by their state's laws just because a visitor from a state offering higher
protection decides to visit there," relied upon by the Court in Cipolla, 267 A.2d at 857,
was clearly demonstrated by the Court in Miller v. Miller, supra, note 26, at 237 N.E.2d
at 881-2. The Cipolla Court merely stated a conclusion while the Miller Court precisely
analyzed whether any unfairness would result.
42. I disagree with the approach of the dissenting justice in Cipolla that Pennsylvania
law should have been applied because it was the "better law." When courts have talked in
terms of the "better law," as in Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968),
not coincidentally, the "better law" has been its own. In Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., supra,
note 25, the federal court sitting as a Wisconsin court, assumed that Wisconsin would
apply its limitation rule to advance its governmental interest notwithstanding that "no
limitation" would be considered the "better law." See also the discussion in Fuerste v.
402
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reconsidered that concern, I find that it has no justification and this is
apart from whether it could be argued that the fact that the insurance
company was Pennsylvania-based was sufficient. What I want to do now
is to retract my statement to the effect that: "A state may not apply its
law solely on the ground that the plaintiff is a resident of that state. If
defendant did nothing in forum, the causing of an injury to the forum's
resident in another state would not be a sufficient constitutional contact
to justify the forum's applying its own law."43 Totally eliminating the
notion of sufficient constitutional contacts as such, I would say that
the forum may apply its own law on the ground that the plaintiff is a
resident of that state where: (1) the fact of residency gives it an interest
in applying its law on the issue as to which a conflict exists, and (2)
the application of its law does not produce fundamental unfairness or
defeat the legitimate expectations of the other party.
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions involving constitutional
limitations on choice of law indicates that interest and fairness deter.
mine constitutionality rather than factual contacts. 44 In Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Dick,45 it could not be said that Texas had any legitimate
interest in applying its law to invalidate a built-in limitation period
contained in a contract between a Mexican insurer and a Texas cor-
poration covering property situate in Mexico. Moreover, that case
involved a consensual transaction centered in Mexico, so that the in-
surer should have been entitled to rely on the Mexican law upholding
the validity of those agreements. 46 In Cipolla Pennsylvania had a real
interest in implementing its tort policy of allowing recovery to an in-
jured Pennsylvanian irrespective of where the accident occurred since
the social and economic consequences of the injury would be felt in
Pennsylvania. And as we have previously demonstrated, neither the
Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 834-5 (Iowa 1968). If the forum's "worse law" is judicially-created,
the court can abandon it. If it is legislatively created, and the legislation is constitutional,
the court may not properly refuse to apply it when the policy to be implemented by the
law is equally applicable to an interstate situation. In this regard I am in full agreement
with Professor Cavers. See Cavers, Conflict of Laws: Roundtable Symposium, 49 TEx. L.
R v. 211, 212-215 (1971).
43. Supra, note 19.
44. This matter is thoroughly discussed in B. Currie, supra, note 10, ch. 5. See alsoClay v. Sun Insurance Co., Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the latest "Supreme Court word" on
the subject. Although the Court talked about "ample contacts with the present transaction
and the parties," the rationale of the decision is fully consistent with the interest and
fairness test.
45. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
46. In Clay the Court referred to Dick as a case where activities in the forum were
"wholly lacking." 377 U.S. at 182. As Professor Currie observes, "Texas had no legitimate
interest in the application of its law and policy." B. Currie, supra, note 10 at 232.
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nominal defendant nor the insurance company could be said to have
relied on the Delaware law in the expectation of avoiding liability.47
Thus, under the interest and fairness test, the application of Pennsyl-
vania law here is fully constitutional. The causing of an injury to the
forum's resident in another state, I now realize, is a sufficient constitu-
tional basis for the forum's applying its own law because of its obvious
interest in so doing and because, as has been demonstrated, this pro-
duces no unfairness to the other party or his insurer.
Having been liberated from my past obeisance to the territorial
imperative, I am now prepared to go further and argue that the result
in an interstate automobile accident case should not depend upon
which side of the state line it occurred. This would mean, realistically,
that when the plaintiff resides in a recovery state and suit is brought
there, that state should apply its own law irrespective of where the ac-
cident occurred and where the defendant resides. I have obviously
taken a rather strong anti-territorialist position. A critic of my position
would probably confront me with the following case to prove its un-
soundness. In the middle of Delaware a Pennsylvania student going to
school in Southern Delaware hitches a ride with a Delaware driver
going in that direction, and shortly afterwards an accident occurs. Suit
is brought in Pennsylvania, where the driver is personally served. It
is defended by his Delaware insurance company, which, we will assume,
does no business in Pennsylvania. How would I decide that case, my
critic would ask?
I could respond to my critic in the classic manner of a law professor
and instead of answering the question, come back with a question of
my own: To the best of your knowledge, has such a case come before
an appellate court for decision? I know of none. All of the conflicts
guest statute cases I have seen involve parties who have had a prior
relationship before the trip began. I think that the "hitchhiker" case
is largely a matter of myth.48 Admittedly, cases reaching an appellate
court represent only a small number of the cases actually litigated
(although I think the proportion is substantially higher for conflicts
cases) and only an infinitesimal number of the cases that actually arise.
But whether or not the appellate court cases accurately mirror the
47. Again, this point is made crystal clear by the discussion in Miller v. Miller, supra,
note 41. Analogously, it should be noted that in Cipolla the driver would have been fully
liable to a non-guest and that the coverage had to extend to out-of-state accidents.
48. Although I have not checked this out, I would imagine that the overwhelming
majority of non-conflicts guest-host cases involve parties who have had a prior relationship
before the trip began.
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cases that arise, they are the cases in which courts make conflicts law
and the cases about which academic commentators speculate. Since
the reported cases do not appear to involve this situation, I would
query whether it is a valid one to demonstrate the soundness or un-
soundness of my position.
But I will not take the academic "cop-out"; I will try to deal with
this completely hypothetical case. Looking at what I call the existential-
legal component, this is a very different case from Cipolla. Here the
state line is factually real. The functional socio-economic and mobility
area where the accident occurred was solely in Delaware. Secondly, the
plaintiff and nominal defendant may really be adverse.49 The driver
may be regretful that he picked up the plaintiff, particularly if he
thinks that his involvement in this accident on which a suit has been
filed may increase his insurance rates.5 0 On the other hand, he may feel
guilty about the accident and want to see the plaintiff compensated.
We are not likely to know the answer to this question in the context
of adversary litigation. If the real purpose of a guest statute were to
protect the host from ungrateful guests rather than to protect insurance
companies,5 1 it should be up to the host-insured whether or not to as-
sert the defense. And he should be able to refuse to do so without
jeopardizing his insurance claim of liability protection. Of course, this
is not the way it is, and the host will have no say in the matter. The
insurance company's lawyer will assert the defense. In terms of interest
analysis, this case still presents a true conflict. Pennsylvania's interest
in providing compensation for its resident victim is the same as in
Cipolla. Delaware's interest, however, may be stronger, since it is in-
terested in protecting the profits of a Delaware insurance company as
well as in preventing the somewhat hypothetical increase in insurance
rates. But the major existential-legal difference is that the accident oc-
curred exclusively in a Delaware functional, socio-economic and mobil-
ity area rather than in a Pennsylvania-Delaware one, as in Cipolla.
The first question I would ask is whether Pennsylvania has jurisdic-
tion to hear the case at all. Since the insurance company does not do
business in Pennsylvania, jurisdiction can only be based on the per-
sonal service obtained against the driver in Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction
49. If they are, service on the non-resident defendant in Pennsylvania is not very
likely. At least it will not be pre-arranged.
50. Whether rates will be increased probably will not depend on the fact that a suit
has been filed. Apparently insurance company rating practices depend on accident involve-
ment rather than liability.
51. This is a legitimate interest notwithstanding that it may be hypothetical.
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based on personal service, the "power myth of jurisdiction," is com-
pletely indefensible, as Professor Ehrenzweig has so ably demon-
strated.52 If the Pennsylvania court would be prepared to abandon the
power myth in favor of an exercise of jurisdiction based on minimum
contracts, 53 it would probably have to dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction. The residence of the plaintiff, without more, would not
constitute a minimum contact justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. 54
Here the accident occurred in a Delaware functional, socio-economic
and mobility area, the driver-whose interests may be adverse to the
plaintiff-was from Delaware, and the insurance company did no
business in Pennsylvania. Because the accident occurred in an area
that was solely within Delaware and because a Pennsylvania insurer is
not involved, the Delaware state line should be significant here. Even
if Pennsylvania is not prepared to abandon the power myth of jurisdic-
tion, it should in this case recognize the significance of a state line and
not apply its own law. In any event, if it were not for the power myth
of jurisdiction, this case could not arise, even hypothetically.
However, it is highly unlikely that the insurance company would
not be doing business in Pennsylvania since most automobile liability
insurance companies are national concerns. It is therefore probable,
even assuming the same facts regarding the accident, that the driver's
insurance company was doing business in Pennsylvania. This being so,
the plaintiff should be able to sue in Pennsylvania on the ground that
the defendant's insurance company is doing business there. I would
allow such a suit, even in the absence of a direct action statute, since
the courts can recognize-even if the legislature does not-that per-
sonal injury litigation is between the plaintiff and the driver's insur-
ance company. In this case, not only is Pennsylvania a proper forum,
but it is equally proper for Pennsylvania to apply its own law. There is
no unfairness in Pennsylvania's imposing liability on an insurance
company doing business in Pennsylvania when one of its insureds
injures a Pennsylvania resident, irrespective of where the accident oc-
curs or where the particular vehicle is insured. And, again, Pennsyl-
vania's interest in providing compensation for its injured resident at
the expense of the insurance company is no less than Delaware's in-
52. Supra, note 33.
53. See the discussion, supra, note 33 at 312-4.
54. A long-arm statute providing for the exercise of jurisdiction solely on the basis
of the plaintiff's residence, it may be assumed, would be held unconstitutional. See note
23, supra.
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terest in protecting insurance companies or in trying to keep down
insurance rates. Since the driver's insurance company does business in
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania can properly hear the case and apply its
law allowing recovery.
To make my next point, however, I want to disregard reality once
again and assume that the driver's insurance company does not do
business in Pennsylvania. This time our plaintiff is a housewife who
lives in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. She is shopping in downtown
Wilmington and during a downpour is given a lift by a passing motorist
to her destination three blocks away. An accident occurs, and she is
severely injured. We will assume that Pennsylvania has abolished
jurisdiction based on personal service, or, that in any event, that the
driver cannot be personally served in Pennsylvania. Suppose that she
brings suit against the driver and his insurance company in Pennsyl-
vania. Can Pennsylvania take jurisdiction55 and apply its own law to
allow recovery? I would say yes on the ground that in this situation:
(1) Pennsylvania is not an inconvenient forum, and (2) the application
of Pennsylvania law is not fundamentally unfair and would not defeat
the legitimate expectations of the parties. I have thus tied jurisdiction
and choice of law together, as I did in the two previous examples,56 in
a manner similar to Professor Ehrenzweig's "proper law in a proper
forum" approach,57 although he certainly would not agree with my
view as to proper law,58 but might as to proper forum.59
My justification for this anti-territorialist heresy both as to jurisdic-
tion and choice of law goes to the matter of area.6 0 As Cipolla indicates,
Southeastern Pennsylvania and Northern Delaware, particularly Del-
aware County, Pennsylvania, and Wilmington, Delaware, constitute a
55. We will assume adequate notice on the basis of substituted service. In this situa-
tion notice should present no practical problems.
56. Where the accident occurred in a Delaware functional socio-economic and mobility
area and the insurance company did not do business in Pennsylvania, I said that Penn-
sylvania should not take jurisdiction and that if it did, it should not apply its law. Like-
wise, where the insurance company was doing business in Pennsylvania, I said that
Pennsylvania should take jurisdiction and apply its law.
57. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A Restatement of the "Lex Fori
Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
58. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICt OF LAWS 577-581 (1962). Professor Ehrenzweig contends that
the "true rule" looks to the state where the vehicle is insured.
59. Professor Ehrenzweig upholds the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents "where
fair play and the opportunity to be heard will be secured by proper notice and 'minimum
contacts,' such as the place of contracting, performance or residence." Supra, note 58 at
120. Although he does not discuss "area," it would seem that this concept would satisfy his
"fair play" criteria.
60. Area is only significant in the unlikely event that the insurer does not do business




functional, socio-economic and mobility area. People working in
Wilmington may live in Delaware County. People living in Delaware
County may shop in Wilmington. The interdependence and inter-
relationship between these parts of the two states make the state line
functionally irrelevant. If this is so, then, in my opinion, at least for
jurisdiction and choice of law purposes, that state line should be legally
irrelevant as well. It is certainly more "convenient" for a resident of
Wilmington-and his Delaware insurance company-to defend an ac-
tion in the courts of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, than it is for a
resident of Pittsburgh. Yet the "state line syndrome" would say that the
resident of Pittsburgh is subject to the jurisdiction6x of the Delaware
County courts while the resident of Wilmington is not. Likewise, the
resident of Wilmington is far more likely to be driving through Del-
aware County on a day-to-day basis than is the resident of Pittsburgh.
As to him, Pennsylvania law is equally "foreseeable and insurable," 62
and to hold him and his insurer to the Pennsylvania standard when he
injures a Pennsylvanian on the Delaware side of the area is in no sense
fundamentally unfair and will defeat no legitimate expectations of
him or his insurer.63
I am thus prepared to carry my analysis of Cipolla to this "logical
conclusion" and to disregard completely the significance of a state line
in most automobile accident cases. 64 When one of the states in a func-
tional, socio-economic and mobility area would allow the plaintiff to
recover, I would say that he should be able to sue there and obtain the
benefit of its law.65 When the driver's insurance company does business
in the plaintiff's home state and that state allows the plaintiff to recover,
again he should be able to sue there and obtain the benefit of its law.
This is not a plaintiff-recovers approach. It only appears that way from
my analysis of Cipolla and the spin-off examples, because there the
plaintiff was from a recovery state and the defendant was from a non-
61. While he might be protected from such a suit by venue requirements, this will not
always be true.
62. As to the "foreseeable and insurable" principle, see generally A. Ehrenzweig, supra,
58 at 568-97.
63. As evidenced by the fact that unquestionably there would be liability if the accident
had occurred on the Pennsylvania side of the line.
64. It is only in the unlikely event that the insurer was not doing business in the
plaintiff's home state and that the accident occurred in a functional socio-economic and
mobility area wholly within a single state that the state line would be significant.
65. Where the defendant is from a recovery state, the plaintiff should recover, since the
only state interested in protecting the defendant and his insurer does not do so. Here it
would not matter whether suit was brought in the plaintiff's state or the defendant's state.
See the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 60-61.
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recovery state. I would also contend, however, that when two parties
from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery
state, recovery should be denied, since the only state having a real in-
terest in protecting the plaintiff chooses to protect the insurance com-
pany instead.66
My approach to recovery in automobile accident cases generally looks
to the residence of one or both of the parties.6 7 The place where tortious
conduct occurs is significant in my view only when an admonitory
policy of that state is involved, 68 which will usually not be so in the
automobile accident case, although it sometimes may.69 I may be ac-
cused of advocating a personal law of torts in automobile accident
cases,70 and the charge does not bother me. In this day of the interstate
highway7' and the jet airplane,72 of bedroom suburbs and regional
66. See the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 64-5; Sedler, Babcock
v. Jackson, supra, note 4 at 123-6; Sedler, Symposium, supra, note 4 at 226-7. Where suit is
brought in the parties' home state, that state, assuming it has abandoned the traditional
approach, will apply its own law and deny recovery. See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.
2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107
(1968). The crucial question is what the courts of the recovery state will do, and here the
courts are divided. Recovery was allowed in Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky.
1968), and in Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), and denied in
Thompson v. Thompson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
67. Where the defendant's home state allows recovery, recovery should be allowed
irrespective of whether or not it is allowed by the law of the plaintiff's home state. If
the plaintiff and defendant are from the same state, I would apply that state's law either
way. A true conflict, in my view, arises only where the plaintiff is from a recovery state
and the defendant is from a non-recovery state. There I would say that each state should
apply its own law.
68. See the discussion, supra, note 6 and accompanying text. Thus, I argue that where
a party from a non-recovery state commits an intentional tort against a victim from a
non-recovery state in a recovery state, the recovery state should apply its own law. See
the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra, note 4 at 67-8. By the same token where
a recovery state defendant commits an intentional tort against a recovery state plaintiff
in a non-recovery state, the parties' home state may decide that its law is inapplicable,
particularly where the tort is not one that results in personal injury. See Tattis v. Karthans,
215 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1968) (actionable word statute inapplicable where publication took
place in North Carolina, which did not impose such liability). But where Mississippi
parties are involved in an automobile accident in a non-recovery state, Mississippi will
apply its own law. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
69. However, the automobile accident cases involving an admonitory policy of the
state where tortious conduct has occurred see the accident resulting from that conduct
occurring in another state. Moreover, the state where the act occurred was the residence
of the defendant. See Gaither v. Myers, Williams v. Rawling Truck Line, Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel Co., supra, note 6.
70. In Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1965), the Court, in refusing
to apply New York law on the issue of guest-host immunity to an accident occurring in
Colorado between two New Yorkers, observed that to apply New York law would be to
"give an overriding significance to a single factor reminiscent of the days when British
citizens travelled to the four corners of the world secure in the belief that their conduct
would be governed solely by the law of England."
71. This means that two parties from the same state travelling in separate vehicles may
become involved in an accident in another state. See e.g., Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co.,
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shopping centers, it makes far more sense to me to look to the place
where the social and economic consequences of allowing or disallowing
recovery will be felt rather than the place where an accident happened
to occur.73 The place where an accident occurs may not be "fortuitous"
in the sense that if the vehicle or vehicles had not been in that particu-
lar place at that particular time there would not have been an accident,
but in realistic and practical terms, it is certainly irrelevant.
My fundamental quarrel with territorialism, enlightened or not, is
that it necessarily attaches significance to the existence of a state line.
As Professor Cavers has stated:
Our states and nations are territorially organized; the legal order
that each has created impinges on actions and affairs which, in a
very high proportion of all instances, are wholly domestic to the
state where they take place. To withdraw like actions and affairs
from the reach of domestic law because the persons participating
in them are not domestic to the state causes a wrench away from
customary attitudes toward law .... 74
Professor Twerski in his article75 refers to a state's "anti-tort" policy
determination, e.g., that a guest cannot recover from a host, as a "policy
determination of the highest order," and goes on to assert that, "To
say it is a localized judgment and that this high priority moral state-
ment is for local consumption only is to deny the potency of the very
decision to negate normal compensatory policies." While I cannot
disagree with either statement as such, they seem to beg the fundamen-
tal question. The fact that state lines exist does not mean that they
should be significant in automobile accident cases. The fact that
limiting policy determinations represented by a state's law to residents
of a state will make those determinations less potent furnishes no
justification for applying them to non-residents when other considera-
tions militate against this.
The state line as a basis for the solution of conflicts problems be-
comes significant only if we make it. We can solve these problems on
supra, note 6; Mitchell v. Craft, supra, note 68; Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264
P.2d 944 (1953).
72. Even the territorialists would not contend that the place where the airplane
crashed should be significant in determining limitations on the amount recoverable for
wrongful death, which will usually be the issue in such cases.
73. Where both parties are from a recovery state, the case, of course, presents a false
conflict, and Professor Cavers would agree that the law of the parties' home state allowing
recovery should be applied. See the discussion in D. Cavers, supra, note 2 at 151. But see
Twerski, supra, note 3 at 15-18.
74. D. Cavers, supra, note 2 at 135.
75. Twerski, supra, note 3 at 16.
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the basis of territorialism or we can look at them existentially in light
of social, economic and behaviorial realities. We can give maximum
weight to the place where an automobile accident occurred or we can
recognize that in this day and age the social and economic consequences
of automobile accidents will be felt in the place where the parties
live. We can see state lines as marking off separate "sovereignties" or
we can look to functional, socio-economic and mobility areas which
often cut across state lines. The question is which approach is more
valid to enable us to solve the kinds of problems that confront courts
in conflicts cases.
In Cipolla, if the accident had occurred in Delaware County, Penn-
sylvania, instead of in Wilmington, Delaware, the plaintiff could have
recovered; because it occurred on the Delaware side of the line, he is
barred. But the human dimension of the case is the same in either case.
A young man is injured when riding in the automobile of a friend
while they are. on their way from the school they both attend to the
young man's home. The driver would like to see the victim recover,
but his insurance company, for obvious reasons, does not. Because of
the difference in the laws of the two states that make up the functional,
socio-economic and mobility area in which they live, we say that there
is a conflict of laws. The suit is brought in the plaintiff's home state
where the insurance company apparently has its principal place of
business and where it may be incorporated. The social and economic
consequences of the accident upon the victim will be felt in that state.
Under its law the plaintiff is entitled to recover and if the accident had
occurred on the Pennsylvania side of the line there is no doubt that
recovery would be allowed. But since it occurred on the Delaware side,
under the territorialist view, recovery should be denied. Thus, the
human result would depend on whether the accident occurred on the
Delaware or Pennsylvania side of the line, a difference of a few miles.76
Quid est demonstrandum.
76. I cannot resist taking some issue with Professor Twerski's example of the "argu-
ment at a friend's house," supra, note 3 at 14. He suggests that the couple at whose home
the argument takes place will be far more "interested" in the matter than the couple who
were not present, but were told about it later. I question whether this will necessarily be
so. The fact that the argument took place in the first couple's home is a factor to be
considered, and based on that factor alone, they are more likely to be talking about it.
But this is only one factor. Their "interest" will depend also on their own marital situa-
tion and their identification or lack of identification with the arguing parties. The couple
who were not present may in reality be more interested, particularly if they had a similar
argument recently and/or have serious inlaw problems. Likewise the fact that an accident
occurs within a state may give rise to an interest on the part of that state in applying its
own law but then again it may not. One of the functions of interest analysis is to deter-
mine when such an interest exists.
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For conflicts law to disregard the significance of a state line in auto-
mobile accident cases is merely to bring that body of law into line
with reality and with the behavior patterns and way of life of the
people whom law is designed to serve. It is time to stop worshipping at
the altar of the state line.
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